Welcome to The Hundred. This week, we’re talking to Colin P. Clarke from the Soufan Center about the return of ISIS.
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Dr. Colin P. Clarke is the Executive Director of The Soufan Center. He was previously a professor at Carnegie Mellon University and a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation. Clarke is the author of After the Caliphate. Our questions are in bold, his answers in block quotes.
How powerful was ISIS at its peak?
At its peak, ISIS controlled territory equivalent to the size of the UK and ruled over a population of between 8 and 12 million people. The group also made millions of dollars through a range of illicit activities, including the smuggling and trafficking of oil, kidnapping for ransom, robbery and theft, extortion and protection payments, and a range of other mafia-style activities. ISIS attracted tens of thousands of foreign fighters from dozens of countries to join its caliphate. The group also conducted external operations throughout the West, either directing or inspiring terrorist attacks on multiple continents.
Then ISIS was massively weakened through military force. What did that campaign look like?
The military campaign to defeat ISIS was a massive, coordinated campaign led by the United States military, but also featuring Kurdish militias, the Iraqi Security Forces, Iraqi specialized counterterrorism forces, and even Shiite militias backed by Iran. The campaign featured an air component with precision strikes, surveillance, and close air support to degrade ISIS leadership, but also commando raids against high-value targets. There were key battles that took place across Kobani, Ramadi and Fallujah, Mosul, and Raqqa.
And yet, you recently argued that there’s renewed risk. How so?
Yes, there’s renewed risk because, contrary to President Trump’s claims during his first administration, the Islamic State was never defeated. Indeed, it had most of its territory revoked, but the group’s ideology continues to resonate with individuals throughout the Middle East and beyond, and the governance gaps and security deficits in Syria allowed the group to retain a toehold in the central Badia desert. From there, it continued to recruit, rearm, and reorganize. Just last week, ISIS claimed more than a dozen deadly attacks in Syria.
How does this relate to the fall of former Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad?
Any time a country experiences a long and bloody civil war, as Syria did, and then transitions to a post-conflict setting where the country needs to be rebuilt economically, politically, etc., there are going to be challenges. Assad ruled with an iron fist for so long, and his father before him, that it helped create conditions that are ripe for a group like ISIS to exploit. ISIS successfully leveraged the grievances to gain political legitimacy among hardline jihadists and parlayed that into a proto-state.
How many attacks are we actually talking about?
The attacks ebb and flow over time. Last year, ISIS took responsibility for 294 attacks in Syria, up from 121 in 2023; estimates by the United Nations and human rights groups are even higher. The number of attacks can fluctuate, but it is also possible that ISIS attacks become more complex and lethal. If ISIS is able to destabilize the al-Sharaa government, it could plunge Syria back into widespread sectarian warfare, which will have a ripple effect throughout the Middle East.
Can you give us a concrete example?
One of the most recent examples of the power that ISIS still has in Syria is the suicide attack linked to ISIS targeting a Greek Orthodox church in Damascus in June, which killed 25 and injured 63. In August, ISIS launched more than two dozen attacks across northeastern Syria, relying on a combination of guerrilla tactics, including small arms fire, ambushes, assassinations, and improvised explosive devices targeting military checkpoints and government vehicles.
American troops are still in Syria. What are they doing?
U.S. troops are still operating in Syria, essentially continuing the anti-ISIS mission through training, intelligence, logistics, and coordination support to local partner forces, including the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). A U.S. troop presence serves the dual purpose of providing a bulwark against Iran—just the mere presence of American troops in Syria is a deterrent against Tehran’s desire to restore its influence in the country after the fall of Assad, which was a devastating blow to the Iranians.
What happens if they withdraw?
In September 2024, Washington and Baghdad announced that the Global Coalition would end its military mission in Iraq by the end of September 2025 and in Syria by September 2026. If the U.S. withdraws, it immediately provides an opportunity for ISIS to resurge in certain parts of the country. It also impacts the bandwidth of the Syrian security forces, which will be challenged to deal with ISIS without a U.S. backstop. The Trump administration may also regret withdrawing troops, because, as we’ve seen in Afghanistan, without a presence, it makes gaining an accurate intelligence picture of threats far more difficult.
What’s a question you wish you were asked and what’s your answer to it?
I guess I wished you had asked about the political will of the entire counter-ISIS coalition. Like other international organizations, it seems that without U.S. presence and funding, many of these organizations lose steam. But with the requisite amount of political will, the other 88 members of the Global Coalition to Defeat Daesh should step up and continue the fight against ISIS.
That’s it for this edition of The Hundred. Please share this post with friends and colleagues if you found it interesting. If you’re reading this via Substack and not email, you can also restack it. Thanks!
Thank you.
This is an excellent explainer.