Interview: The End of Assad
#82: With Caspar Schliephack
Welcome to The Hundred! If you would like to support our work, you can order my new book, How Tyrants Fall: And How Nations Survive. I’m delighted to say that The Economist recommends it as one of the best books of the year. Given the fall of Assad, it feels especially relevant these days.
Caspar Schliephack is an Islamic studies specialist. He works on security-related issues, particularly focusing on organized crime and Islamist groups in the Middle East and Europe. Our questions are in bold, his answers in block quotes.
Who is Bashar al-Assad?
Bashar al-Assad came to power in 2000 after the death of his father, who had ruled Syria as a tyrant since the early seventies. While he constantly tried to project the image of a statesman-like, modern, and rather responsible politician to the public, he and his regime maintained a merciless stranglehold on Syria and its people. For decades, he had plundered the country’s wealth and used fierce oppression to crush any form of dissent. Whenever a part of the population tried to break free, even just a little, the response was massive violence. Bashar al-Assad is also a cunning opportunist who, despite immense pressure, repeatedly managed to keep himself and his regime in power, often through successfully mobilizing foreign powers for support. He is a war criminal and the former head of a brutal regime that has brought unspeakable suffering, death and displacement to millions of Syrians. And now he is on the run from his own people, who have overthrown him after decades of bloody struggle, hiding in Russia.
How did he cling to power during the Syrian civil war?
In short: Extreme violence, foreign allies, many hollow promises to his loyalist support base and drug money. Like his father’s, Bashar’s regime faced widespread rejection and resistance, which repeatedly manifested in the form of open protests and violent opposition. Despite several decisive events that shook his regime to the core, Assad repeatedly managed to save himself and to prolong his rule: when hundreds of thousands of brave Syrians took to the streets in 2011 to protest against the regime and its terror; when thousands of soldiers and officers deserted his army; when, as early as 2012, rebels advanced towards central sites within Damascus and killed several key figures of the regime, including the Defense Minister and several high-ranking generals; when the regime used chemical weapons against its own civilian population in 2013, and the then-US president failed to respond despite his “red line” warning; when regime forces and rebels besieged each other in Aleppo and the regime lost large parts of the country, including provincial capitals, border crossings, and lucrative gas and oil resources to various rebel groups, Kurdish forces, or the Islamic State.
With every setback, Assad relied on a perfidous strategy that included the use of even more brutal violence against his political opponents – preferably against civilians – and alliances with external forces that, starting around 2012 on the ground and from 2015 in the air, secured important military successes for the regime. While punishing cities and villages that had freed themselves from his rule with sieges, starvation, relentless shelling, including the use of chemical weapons and barrel-bombs, as well as the targeted destruction of civilian infrastructure, such as hospitals, he mobilized his supporters with the promise that only he could save Syria from terrorism. To finance his apparatus of repression in the face of the escalating war, the Assad regime also transformed into a drug cartel, massively producing an amphetamine-like drug named Captagon, in particular. Factories operated by Assad’s security forces, now discovered by anti-Assad groups, highlight the scale of the drug production. Experts estimate that the regime earned several billion dollars annually from this trade that was also described as the regime’s “lifeline”.
Who supported Assad within Syrian society?
The entire system was characterized by nepotism and corruption, and the regime’s hold on power was based on ensuring and creating direct dependencies of individuals and communities on Bashar al-Assad and his inner circle. The regime promised its supporters financial benefits and security in exchange for their loyalty. In reality, however, only selected elites with direct links to the regime’s inner circle reaped the rewards. Its beneficiaries were drawn from different sects and ethnic groups. At the same time the Assad regime has used a set of nuanced narratives that center around the idea that “true Syria’s” survival hinges on Assad’s continued rule, presenting him as the sole protector amidst chaos, conflict and sectarianism. But contrary to its claims, the regime has deliberately played on sectarian and ethnic identities since the 1970s.
This policy is particularly evident when looking at Syria’s Alawite communities, who are often wrongly generalized as strong supporters of the regime despite the existence of numerous Alawite dissidents. Fearing a return to persecution and marginalization, as they experienced under Ottoman rule, and hoping for privileged positions in the state that is run by a fellow Alawite, many Alawites were willing to defend the regime for a long time, even at great personal cost and despite the fact that they still largely live in poverty today. In the end, Assad lost his credibility and support even among his hardcore followers and beneficiaries.
How about foreign supporters?
The survival of the Syrian regime depended on its allies. During the civil war, two interventions prevented the military collapse of Assad’s forces, which had repeatedly proven to be notoriously ineffective in battle. From Iran’s perspective Syria was a crucial part of the “Axis of Resistance”, and a large portion of Iran’s support to the Lebanese Hezbollah flew through Syria. When Assad’s forces began to lose control in some parts of the country in 2012, Iran intervened massively on Assad’s side. Iran-controlled militias, such as the Lebanese Hezbollah, along with Shiite militias composed of Iraqi, Afghan, and Pakistani fighters sent thousands of men. In many battles these units bore the brunt of the fighting. Additionally, Iran deployed military advisors and organized the training of local pro-regime militias. In 2015, Russia also decided to openly intervene militarily on Assad’s side, primarily using its air force and some special forces units in order to secure the regime’s survival. For Russia, Syria serves as a logistical hub from which it can exert influence across the entire Mediterranean, the Middle East and Africa.
Why did Assad fall so quickly?
He didn’t fall quickly at all. On the contrary, if one looks not only at the last 13 days but at the last thirteen years, it becomes clear that he was able to cling to power for a long time and on several occasions avert his downfall - and that HTS is now reaping the rewards of the decades-long struggle of countless Syrians. The rule of the Assads lasted for more than 50 years, and the regime ultimately fell only after decades of resistance, protests, bloody conflict, and hundreds of thousands of casualties. HTS and its allies celebrate their victory on the streets of Damascus, while countless Syrians, whose efforts and sacrifices made this victory possible, never lived to see the liberation. Their traces are lost in the regime’s dungeons and mass graves. I want to emphasize this point: The latest military operation is therefore just a small piece in a decades-long struggle by countless Syrians to overthrow the Assads. By the end of 2024 Bashar al-Assad’s survival strategies no longer worked, as his allies were militarily weakened, and anti-Assad forces launched an offensive. HTS successfully targeted the few combat-capable elite units of the regime with FPV drones and the remaining units of the Syrian Armed Forces were neither capable nor willing to put up a fight in order to save their master’s reign.
Tell us a bit more about Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. What do these people want?
HTS (Hayat Tahrir al-Sham) is a powerful armed faction in Syria that led the latest military offensive that resulted in the liberation from the Assad regime and is now the most influential force in the Syrian transitional government. HTS’ roots lie in jihadism, namely in terror organizations such as ISIS and al-Qaeda. It is therefore designated as a terrorist organization. While its leader, Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa aka Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, has distanced himself from ISIS and al-Qaeda in the past and HTS has subsequently fought against members of these organizations, the group still maintains alliances with other, smaller jihadist groups. The predecessor group of HTS, the al-Nusra Front, is responsible for numerous war crimes and many assassinations of democratic activists, members of rival Syrian factions and civilians. Thus the al-Nusra-Front heavily manipulated the course of the Syrian revolution. This has led to accusations of calculated opportunism and a strong drive for power.
At the same time HTS has ruled over parts of the Aleppo and Idlib provinces in recent years, securing the control of the unrecognized Syrian Salvation Government in these areas. In these regions, HTS has pursued a kind of state-building project, with attempts to involve different groups within Syrian society. Al-Jolani has also long placed emphasis on presenting a moderate and statesmanlike image, recently stating in interviews that he aims to achieve stability and security for all Syrians. Thus, the exact ideological positioning of HTS remains controversial even among experts and the question of their ideological trajectory is undoubtedly a complex one. However, many Syrians are justifiably skeptical of al-Jolani and HTS and many fear a new civil war and atrocities against minorities on the horizon. As one of the most powerful men in Syria, al-Jolani will now have the opportunity to reveal his true intentions to the world and to his fellow Syrians.
What does the regime’s collapse mean for the Islamic State and other terrorist groups in the region?
For one terrorist organization, the fall of Assad represents a catastrophic defeat, and the loss of its main supply routes constitutes an existential threat: Lebanese Hezbollah.
From the perspective of many actors of political Islam around the world, the victory over Assad now opens new spaces for activity. This range includes Syrian Islamists with local agendas, organizations close to the Muslim Brotherhood, and a range of Salafist groups. The impact of this development will not only affect Syria’s neighboring countries, especially Lebanon, but also distant arenas. Many smaller jihadist groups are allied with HTS and have fought alongside them for years, some consisting of Syrian fighters, others of foreign fighters. Often, their views on religious minorities and issues of state and law are extreme, carrying significant potential for conflict regarding Syria’s future. For groups with fighters from other Arab countries, the Balkans, the North Caucasus, and Central Asia, Syria will serve as a base to pursue their goals in their respective home countries.
The Islamic State, while significantly weakened, still maintains support networks and scattered military units in remote desert regions of Syria. In the past, ISIS has repeatedly exploited instability to strengthen its structures, free supporters from prisons, and acquire weapons. The current situation in Syria offers ideal conditions for such activities and possibly a resurgence. Signs that ISIS might actually succeed in regaining strength would include the assassination of local dignitaries in selected areas, successful attacks on prisons where ISIS members are held, mass casualty terror attacks against minorities, as well as strikes on military and civilian targets crucial for Syria’s reorganization and stability.
What’s a question you wish you were asked and what’s your answer to it?
What will happen to the multi-billion-dollar Captagon trade after the collapse of the Assad regime, which has been the main player in this business?
I am sure that the huge profits generated by the Captagon business will remain a focal point for many groups in Syria and beyond - especially in regions plagued by war, inflation, economic crisis, and poverty, where generations of young men were forced to fight in trenches instead of learning a trade.
It is likely that new players will attempt to establish themselves in this arena and, through violence, carve out their territories. This could lead to parts of the Captagon production facilities moving from Syria to other countries, while old players like former Syrian officers or Hezbollah-affiliated drug lords may strike new deals to remain relevant. The Captagon trade will evolve, not disappear.
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Very informative. I hope the news media maintains an interest in Syria. I will be very interested to see how HTS evolves and whether their moderation is just a facade or not. That said it's hard to see a leader of an armed group making serious moves towards tolerating dissent and accepting elections which it could lose.