Interview: Crisis in Haiti
#69: With Sophie Rutenbar
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Sophie Rutenbar is a Foreign Policy Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution and a Visiting Scholar at New York University’s Center on International Cooperation (CIC). She was previously the mission planning officer for the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti. Our questions are in bold, her answers in block quotes.
Why was Haitian Prime Minister Ariel Henry unpopular?
In part, Ariel Henry was unpopular because he was nominated for the prime minister role by someone – former President Jovenel Moise, who was assassinated in July 2021 – who was himself extremely unpopular. President Moise named Henry as his next prime minister less than three days before his assassination, but Henry hadn’t been sworn in. In the two weeks after the assassination, a group of countries called the Core Group played a key role in behind-the-scenes negotiations that resulted in Henry taking office, which was announced in a Core Group communique. Henry was therefore also seen as a creature of the international community, particularly the US.
But Henry didn’t make things better for himself. In total, he was prime minister for two and a half years, during which period he did little else other than make, and then not implement, two different agreements on a roadmap toward elections. At the same time, security and socioeconomic conditions in Haiti deteriorated significantly.
How did he lose power?
Henry was out of the country when popular protest and the combined efforts of the Port-au-Prince gangs forced him to agree to step down on 11 March. According to Henry’s second agreement, elections should have been held in 2023 and a new president inaugurated on 7 February 2024, which didn’t happen. The Haitian opposition organized large protests against Henry in early February, but they weren’t enough to force him out.
The turning point was when, on the back of popular protest in late February and early March, the gangs united to attack key government buildings, the country’s two largest prisons, and police stations across the capital. They also shut down operations at the country’s main airport, preventing Henry from returning from abroad. Somewhat ironically, he was at the time in Kenya concluding an agreement to allow the deployment of a Kenyan-led, Security Council-authorized multinational mission to support the Haitian National Police against the gangs.
Is Haiti’s capital now controlled by gangs?
You’ll hear a lot of commentators say that 80 percent of the capital is now controlled by gangs, and that’s roughly true if you look at a map of Port-au-Prince, but it’s more complex than that. Given the minimal presence of state authority, most neighborhoods have long had a baz, which is something between a youth gang and a community protection organization.
But some of these baz have grown and metamorphized over the years into organized criminal groups, with leadership hierarchies, defined and consolidated territories, and multiple revenue streams, including extortion, kidnapping, and weapons and drug trafficking. These groups control the area around key government sites and infrastructure, even if they don’t actually control the buildings themselves. So the major courthouses in downtown Port-au-Prince were essentially non-functional for a couple of years before the latest violence. Similarly, the airport hasn’t yet reopened because police are still working to assure the protection of planes going in and out.
Who is Barbecue?
Barbecue is a former police officer who – after he was fired from the police force for allegedly helping carry out two massacres in 2018 and 2019 – became the leader of a downtown Port-au-Prince gang. Rumored to be on the payroll of former President Moise, he spearheaded the creation in 2020 of a coalition of different gangs called the G9, after the original nine gangs. More recently, he has been behind efforts to try to unite all gangs across Port-au-Prince in a super-coalition called Viv Ansamn (or “Live Together”). The effort faltered when he first tried it last summer, but since the end of February, the combined forces of the gangs have been instrumental in shutting down the city and taking out key infrastructure, forcing the resignation of Prime Minister Henry.
Over the years, Barbecue has talked about leading a revolution on behalf of the poor and downtrodden of Haiti, but these statements haven’t translated into concrete proposals for political change in Haiti. At the same time, he has been connected with multiple instances of serious human rights violations. Nevertheless, he argues that he himself should lead the revolution and should form part of the transitional government.
How challenging is the humanitarian situation in Haiti?
Many Haitians would argue that the situation is as bad as things have been in Haiti since the fall of the Duvalier dictatorship. Around 2,500 people were killed or injured in the first three months of the year, while a large number of medical institutions are closed or non-functioning and close to running out of key medical supplies. Haitians are facing unprecedented levels of food insecurity, and with the main port and airport closed, the World Food Programme estimated that its food stores could run out soon. Nearly half the Haitian population is in need of humanitarian assistance, including three million children.
A new transitional ruling council was sworn in on April 25. Can you explain what it is?
When PM Henry issued his resignation on 11 March, he conditioned it on the establishment of a transitional body to take over leadership. The Caribbean regional organization, CARICOM, masterminded the creation of an agreement to establish a council to serve in place of the president, with the role of appointing a prime minister and overseeing efforts to reestablish security, reform the constitution, and hold elections. The council is unwieldy – it comprises seven voting members from political parties and the private sector, plus two non-voting members from civil society and the religious sector – but it includes representation from all the key players, and it has managed to come up with a political way forward. However, it remains to be seen whether this “seven-headed snake,” as some Haitians are calling it, can hold together and organize elections.
Does the council have a realistic chance of dealing with the gangs?
The council consists of nine members, so no, it’s not an army. Most of their meetings have been virtual because of concerns about insecurity, and the location of the council’s swearing-in ceremony on 25 April ended up being shifted at the last minute to avoid potential gang interference. Now that they’re sworn in, they will be able to apply leverage against the gangs through the Haitian National Police, but the police are demoralized, under-resourced, and rapidly dwindling in numbers. Haiti’s military was re-established in 2017 after being disbanded by former President Aristide, and it consists of only a few hundred soldiers trained and equipped mainly for national disaster response. It’s hard to imagine the Haitian police and military being able to address the gang situation on their own.
What needs to be resolved for Haiti to overcome this crisis?
Haiti has a long history of interference by external actors, most notably the United States. But there are also internal divisions that have prevented Haitians from coming up with a way forward. Haitians from different parts of the country, from different economic and class and educational backgrounds, need to agree on a common vision for their country and need to build trust in each other. To allow trust to flourish, you need transparency, and you need to confront rampant impunity by reinstituting the justice system and reestablishing rule of law.
My greatest concern is that hopes of ordinary Haitians for a better future might be thwarted by those who don’t wish to see their profits reduced by the return of law and order – both businesspeople profiting from disorder and those earning money from the free trafficking of illicit goods. This is why creating transparency and establishing justice is so important.
What role does the United States play?
The United States is to some extent a kingmaker in Haiti, after leading two armed interventions into the country in the last thirty years. The US looms so large in the Haitian imagination that it doesn’t even need to overtly interfere – after the 7 February 2024 expiration of his second political agreement, Henry remained in power largely because a US official indicated that they didn’t consider it a hard deadline. A critical part of moving forward will be the US acting in a supportive manner while letting Haitians figure out the next steps on their own.
What’s a question you wish you were asked and what’s your answer to it?
Everyone always talks about Port-au-Prince. Why is that, and what’s life like in the rest of Haiti right now?
Port-au-Prince is home to at least a quarter of the country’s population, and in better times the city is dense, vibrant, and entrepreneurial. Haiti’s government is highly centralized – a legacy of the French colonial system – so nearly all government structures and processes are housed in Port-au-Prince. Economically, Port-au-Prince is home to Haiti’s main port and airport, and Haiti’s mountainous terrain and distinctive geography mean that nearly all supply lines run through the capital – making transporters easy prey for armed gangs.
Life in the rural areas of Haiti has usually been more peaceful than in the capital, but in recent years, gangs have been expanding their reach into the provinces, particularly the Artibonite Province, the country’s breadbasket. Moreover, the shutdown of the port in Port-au-Prince has seriously affected supplies of fuel, food and other goods to outlying areas. At the same time, more than 100,000 people have left Port-au-Prince for the outlying regions over the last few weeks, increasing population pressures on already-stretched rural infrastructure. A key part of any future reconstruction effort in Haiti will be trying to decentralize government services, localize administration, and build up key rural infrastructure, especially secondary ports.
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