Interview: Civil War in Myanmar
#85: With Lucas Myers
Welcome to The Hundred! If you would like to support our work, you can order my new book, How Tyrants Fall: And How Nations Survive. Given current developments, it seems…especially relevant.
Our interview is a bit longer than usual this week, but the situation in Myanmar is extraordinarily complicated so we wanted to allow our guest more space to provide necessary context. Enjoy!
Lucas Myers is a Senior Associate for Southeast Asia at the Wilson Center’s Indo-Pacific Program. Professionally proficient in Mandarin Chinese, his research interests include Southeast Asia, Chinese foreign policy, and Indo-Pacific security. He focuses on the ongoing conflict in Myanmar and the changing balance of power spurred by the rise of China. Our questions are in bold, his answers in block quotes.
What is the Tatmadaw?
The Tatmadaw is Myanmar’s military. The oldest and strongest institution in the country, the military has exerted a stranglehold on the country’s politics since Myanmar’s independence in 1948. Various military juntas have ruled the country with an iron fist over the intervening decades, justifying their control on the grounds of Buddhist Bamar (the majority ethnic group) ultranationalism and the argument that only the Tatmadaw can keep the ethnic minorities in line and the country together. Facing isolation and economic ruin, the Tatmadaw loosened its grip in the late 2000s, allowing a modest transition to democracy from 2011 to 2021, when the current leadership under Senior General Min Aung Hlaing overthrew the democratically elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi. Today, the Tatmadaw faces a diverse coalition of resistance groups. It is beset by poor morale, a manpower crisis, and a series of irrecoverable losses on the battlefield. That said, it remains a potent force with a deadly air force and control over approximately 50% of the country.
Who is Aung San Suu Kyi?
Viewed by many in Myanmar as beyond reproach as the leader of the country’s democratic movement, Aung San Suu Kyi is the daughter of Aung San, an early Burmese founding father, and the former State Counsellor (essentially the leader of the country) from 2016 until her overthrow in 2021. Aung San Suu Kyi first rose to prominence in 1988 leading a pro-democracy uprising before being subject to house arrest by the military. She continued to fight for democracy from house arrest, winning the Nobel Peace Prize in 1991. Released during the beginning of the transition to democracy in 2010, her political party, the National League for Democracy won an overwhelming electoral victory in 2015. Although legally barred from serving as president, she became “State Counsellor” and effectively led the country until February 2021. Aung San Suu Kyi’s image in the West suffered significantly after the Rohingya Genocide in 2016 and her subsequent public defense of the Tatmadaw’s violent campaign before the International Court of Justice in 2019. The National League for Democracy won a massive landslide in the 2020 elections, which the Tatmadaw chose to overturn in February 2021. Aung San Suu Kyi remains imprisoned by the military, reportedly in poor health.
Why did Myanmar’s military carry out a coup d’etat in 2021?
The Tatmadaw led by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing chose to overthrow the democratically elected National League for Democracy due to Aung San Suu Kyi’s perceived threat to their power, particularly Min Aung Hlaing himself. Importantly, the coup in 2021 cannot be separated from the longstanding struggle for power between the National League for Democracy and the military, which remained unresolved despite the Tatmadaw’s relaxation of direct power after 2011.
As important background, the country never fully transitioned to democracy. The 2008 Constitution promulgated by the military prior to the transition to democracy reserved substantial military control over politics, including 25% of parliamentary seats and control over key ministries. From 2011 to 2016, the military’s proxy party, the USDP, governed the country.
Following its electoral victory in 2015 and its following term in government, the National League for Democracy vowed to amend the constitution to address the military’s control (which proved impossible due to their control over 25% of the seats in parliament). Although Aung San Suu Kyi and Min Aung Hlaing had maintained seemingly cordial relations in public, the relationship broke down over the course of the National League for Democracy’s tenure. By the 2020 elections, the Tatmadaw hoped that its proxy, the USDP could dislodge the National League for Democracy. Instead, Aung San Suu Kyi’s party was returned with a resounding victory, shocking the Tatmadaw. Min Aung Hlaing, who was due to retire in mid-2021, and the Tatmadaw soon began alleging voter fraud (for which there was no evidence). Then, on the morning of February 1st, 2021, military forces rolled into Naypyidaw and arrested Aung San Suu Kyi and prominent members of her government. Announcing a state of emergency (which it has extended several times since), Min Aung Hlaing formed the “State Administration Council,” a new military junta, to rule Myanmar. Fundamentally, the Tatmadaw could not accept any threat to its political prerogatives as represented by the National League for Democracy and Aung San Suu Kyi herself. Their commitment to democratic transition was ultimately tragically shallow.
When did Myanmar’s civil war start?
Myanmar’s civil war is technically the world’s longest running, having started virtually immediately after independence in 1948. However, it has flared up and cooled off at different times throughout the intervening decades. At various times, outside powers have become involved, most importantly the People’s Republic of China’s support for the Communist Party of Burma during the Cold War (up to and including backing an invasion into Myanmar during the 1960s). At its core, the conflict stems from the Buddhist Bamar majority’s dominance of the central government, its mistreatment of the country’s numerous ethnic minorities, and the Tatmadaw’s stranglehold on political power. This intersects with the country’s pro-democracy struggle, resulting in an unresolved conflict that dominates the country’s politics.
Beginning in the 1990s and following the collapse of the Burmese Communists, the Tatmadaw had forged a series of ceasefires with some prominent ethnic armed groups (many of whom survive and fight to this day), while still engaging in fighting against others in the intervening years. This “Peace Process” resulted in a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement in 2015, coinciding with the democratic transition. Fast forward to spring 2021, the Tatmadaw’s coup and violent crackdown on peaceful protesters triggered a resumption of hostilities from most of the ethnic armed groups, including many which had joined in the ceasefires of the past couple of decades.
Despite the length of the overarching post-independence conflict, this post-2021 phase of the war is unprecedented. Firstly, the Bamar majority is now predominantly on the side of the resistance and aligned with the ethnic minority groups, which had not happened to this extent before. This renders the pro-democracy and the ethnic autonomy struggles further intertwined into one much more intense war. Secondly, as a result of the widespread pan-ethnic resistance, the Tatmadaw has faced defeats on the battlefield like never before. Since late-2023, two of its regional military commands, Northeast and Western Commands, have surrendered to resistance forces, an unprecedented development. Moreover, its traditional recruiting grounds in the Bamar-dominated central regions of Anyar, such as Sagaing, Magway, and Bago, are now resistance hotbeds. Despite holding onto the cities and the center, the military has lost control over the country’s periphery and most of its borders.
Who is the regime fighting?
The resistance coalition is broad and diverse, made up of hundreds of local militia and dozens of major actors. Some of the ethnic armed groups have existed since the very beginning of Myanmar’s civil war in 1948, notably the Karen National Union. Others are much newer, springing up after the coup in 2021. Each of these groups has its own interests and relationships with each other, some of which are tense and acrimonious (some armed clashes have occurred, but the resistance forces have largely cohered). Currently, the resistance can be understood to consist of two broad groupings: 1). Pro-democracy forces, and 2). Pro-autonomy groups.
The pro-democracy forces are led in part by the National Unity Government (NUG), which is a shadow government made up of ousted parliamentarians from the National League for Democracy, civil society groups, and other associated politicians. The NUG represents the resistance at the international stage, and it aims to assume control of the central state apparatus in Naypyidaw. Its armed forces are the People’s Defense Forces (PDFs), which formed after the coup and the military’s repression against peaceful protesters. However, only some of the PDFs are under the NUG’s control, while others operate independently or under the command of the ethnic armed groups. Pro-democracy aligned ethnic armed groups include the K3C, which is made up of the Karen National Union, Karenni National Progressive Party, Kachin Independence Army, and Chin National Front (sometimes it is referred to as the “K2C” sans the Kachin depending upon the venue and time due to Kachin concerns about Chinese pressure). There are also other groups in the pro-democracy camp as well. These groups call for an inclusive, federal democracy that overturns the coup, removes the Tatmadaw from its political role, and decentralizes control toward the ethnic minority states.
The pro-autonomy groups are predominantly the Three Brotherhood Alliance, made up of the Arakan Army (AA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (the MNDAA or the Kokang), and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA). The Three Brotherhood Alliance grouping is far and away the most combat capable force in the resistance. Both Tatmadaw regional commands surrendered to Three Brotherhood Alliance, and their troops have proven the strongest threat to the Tatmadaw since they entered the war in late 2023. The Arakan Army now controls most of Rakhine State, while the MNDAA and TNLA have wrested control of northern Shan State from the regime and its allies. These groups are much less committed to democracy, and they instead fight for greater autonomy (or even de facto independence). Importantly, these groups are heavily influenced by China, with the MNDAA most under Beijing’s thumb (if not control). Indeed, China has recently intervened to force MNDAA to sign a ceasefire with the Tatmadaw. Generally authoritarian in their governance, AA in particular has been credibly accused of human rights violations (some of which it has admitted to) against both the Rohingya and prisoners of war. These groups are not publicly aligned with the pro-democracy forces, but collaboration happens behind the scenes, especially on the battlefield.
There are other ethnic armed groups that remain neutral in the current conflict, most importantly the United Wa State Army, which is by far the most powerful army apart from the Tatmadaw in the country. It runs two disconnected regions in Shan State along the border with China, and it operates under Chinese protection. In a complicated situation, it receives weapons from China (as well as producing its own variants), which it then sells or transfers to much of the resistance. It has occasionally chafed under Chinese hegemony, but it largely acts as the PRC’s proxy. It has at times been heavily involved in the drug trade and illegal gambling. The Wa are a key player from the sidelines.
Given the diversity of the coalition, many in the international community fear “fragmentation,” especially as there is no agreed-upon political framework for the postwar situation. However, it is important to reiterate that, despite their differences, the resistance has largely held together and effectively challenged the Tatmadaw on the battlefield. This is the most cohesive and unified resistance movement in Myanmar’s modern history.
The regime seems to be struggling. Is that correct?
The Tatmadaw is losing the war. They have lost the majority of Rakhine, Chin, Kachin, Shan, Karen, and Karenni States, while their hold over regions like Sagaing, Magway, and Bago is increasingly fragile. The junta’s efforts to impose conscription and garner support from Russia and China have thus far failed to stem the bleeding, and its troops are performing poorly in tactical engagements throughout the country. At present, its air force remains its most potent capability. In some cases, regime forces have retaken lost territory, such as at Loikaw, or forced the resistance to withdraw due to aerial bombardment and terror tactics against civilians, but, by and large, the Tatmadaw lacks the strategic reserves to regain the country.
The Tatmadaw’s current exit strategy is to promise “elections” at the end of 2025. Of course, elections in Myanmar under present conditions and the junta’s watch are farcical, and few if any in the country believe they will be legitimate. The resistance actively rejects the elections. However, China has publicly backed the elections and appears to be putting its might behind them (including pushing the Tatmadaw to actually proceed). Beijing’s thinking is that these “elections” could provide some figment of legitimacy to the regime, allow it to negotiate with key members of the resistance coalition, isolate others (most notably the NUG, which China sees as too pro-US and a threat to its interests), and rehabilitate its image in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
However, given the junta’s track record, no one should expect these elections to bring peace to Myanmar. If current trends continue, we should instead expect the Tatmadaw to continue suffering battlefield losses as the war moves into the Bamar heartland.
What’s China’s role?
As already mentioned, China is omnipresent in Myanmar’s modern history and civil war. Beijing is the most influential outside actor bar none by virtue of its size and extensive on-the-ground network of relationships and investments. China’s interests in Myanmar include its billions of dollars worth of Belt and Road Initiative investments (the most important of which is the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor that gives China overland access to the Bay of Bengal, thus bypassing the Malacca Strait chokepoint), stability (due to the risk of refugees and spillover), law enforcement (Myanmar’s infamous “pig butchering” cyber scam epidemic has triggered Beijing’s ire), extracting Myanmar’s natural resources (notably, its significant amount of rare earth minerals), and maintaining its dominance in a country that it views as in its sphere.
Traditionally, Chinese policy toward Myanmar was multifaceted and pragmatic. It engaged most actors in Myanmar’s political scene, including the central government, the military, various ethnic armed groups, and the opposition. Through its Party-to-Party ties, it engaged political parties and ethnic groups, while its State-to-State outreach targeted the government. By working with everybody, China ensured its interests were protected and advanced no matter who won. Indeed, the Chinese government enjoyed warm relations with Aung San Suu Kyi during her tenure as leader.
After the coup, China adopted a somewhat hedged stance. It was cautious, holding the junta at arm’s length. China even reached out to the resistance under the table. Indeed, it never fully trusted the Tatmadaw (who in turn dislike China), and it wanted stability above all. However, this began to change in 2023. The NUG opened an office in Washington, DC, and the United States Congress passed the BURMA Act in 2022, which promised more American support (even if that support proved disappointing to many on the ground). This triggered alarms bells in Beijing, who were now worried that the NUG was far too pro-American, as well as unable to corral the ethnic groups and prevent a fragmented Myanmar. As such, China began to engage more openly with the junta, sending its Foreign Minister to the country and ramping up its support for the Tatmadaw.
Confusingly, there was a brief hiccup in China-Tatmadaw relations in late 2023 when it gave a tacit greenlight to Three Brotherhood Alliance to attack the junta as punishment for the military’s involvement in pig butchering cyber scams, but it soon regretted this action, as the military’s enfeeblement was plain to see. China also saw that its proxies, the Three Brotherhood Alliance, were far more cooperative with the rest of the resistance (including the NUG) than it was comfortable with. Faced with what it saw as the unenviable choice of the Tatmadaw, fragmentation, or some form of resistance victory, China doubled down on the Tatmadaw. In 2024, it moved to restrain the Three Brotherhood Alliance, successfully getting TNLA and MNDAA to enter into a ceasefire with the military. Then, it again bear hugged the military, propping up the Tatmadaw’s 2025 elections as an offramp. Most importantly, the Chinese invited Min Aung Hlaing to China, where he was publicly feted in a propaganda coup. Now, China is firmly behind the military, and it has even established a “joint private security company,” which has allowed Chinese contractors to deploy to protect its Belt and Road investments (they are uninvolved in combat).
China threatens to play the role of kingmaker, especially without greater US support for the resistance. When TNLA and MNDAA restarted offensive operations in mid-2024 against China’s wishes, Beijing moved to blockade their supply lines, cut off their access to Wa weapons, and even kidnapped the leader of MNDAA. These actions forced both groups into public commitments to ceasefires with the Tatmadaw, thus neutralizing two powerful members of the resistance.
How about the United States?
The United States has been the most important and committed backer of the pro-democracy movement in Myanmar. Since the coup in 2021, it has given hundreds of millions of dollars in humanitarian aid, capacity building, and other forms of assistance to civil society and groups on the ground. It has also been involved diplomatically, meeting with the NUG and K3C in public and private settings, while also pressuring the military to come to the table. At the same time, Washington has imposed a range of targeted sanctions upon the military and its backers, aiming to restrict its access to supplies, weapons, financing, and investments.
However, the United States lacks the kind of leverage that China wields. Moreover, the United States’ allies and partners are much less interested in rolling back the military coup. India and Thailand are historically friendly to the Tatmadaw and remain concerned about fragmentation, while Australia and Japan have been reluctant to engage in overt democracy promotion lest China gain in influence. The United States also does not wish to get beyond ASEAN and its comfort zone.
Could this change under the Trump administration? Perhaps, especially if the administration identifies Myanmar as a place where the United States can push back on growing Chinese influence. But, to put it simply, China is massive and close, while the US is distracted and far away.
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